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Winfrey: Border Searches: An Exception to Probable Cause.

BORDER SEARCHES: AN EXCEPTION TO
PROBABLE CAUSE
RONALD R. WINFREY

One of the most fundamental constitutional protections is that
afforded against unreasonable searches and seizures.1 Evidence obtained
2
in contravention of the fourth amendment is excluded by both federal
and state 3 courts. If evidence is to be admissible, it must be the product
of a reasonable search. The Supreme Court has held that a reasonable
search, either with or without a warrant, must be based on probable
cause.

4

Border searches are an exception to the probable cause requirement. 5 In Alexander v. United States6 the court stated:
[I]t is well settled that a search by Customs officials of a vehicle,
at the time and place of entering the jurisdiction of the United
States, need not be based on probable cause; that "unsupported"

or "mere" suspicion alone is sufficient to justify such a search for
7
purposes of Customs law enforcement.

Thus a search deemed reasonable when made by customs officials might
be challenged as violative of the fourth amendment if conducted by
other law enforcement officials under ordinary circumstances. 8
Some writers have considered this exception to the probable cause
requirement a "prostitution of the fourth amendment and the rights it
1 U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
2 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652 (1914).
3 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed.2d 1081 (1961).
4 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161, 45 S. Ct. 280, 288, 69 L. Ed. 543, 554 (1925).
In Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1310-11, 93 L. Ed. 1879,
1890 (1949), the Court, paraphrasing Carroll, stated that:
Probable cause exists where "the facts and circumstances within their [the officers']
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient
in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that" [an] offense
has been or is being committed.
5E.g., Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 977, 87 S. Ct. 519, 17 L. Ed.2d 439 (1966); Thomas v. United States, 372 F.2d 252,
254 (5th Cir. 1967). See generally Comment, Border Searches and the Fourth Amendment,
77 YALE L.J. 1007 (1968) for a discussion of the historical justification for the border search.
6362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 977, 87 S.Ct. 519, 17 L. Ed.2d 439
(1966).
7 Id. at 382.
8 United States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8, 13 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1121, 89
S. Ct. 999, 22 L. Ed.2d 126 (1969).
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secures." 9 Others have questioned the "reasonableness" of border
searches when probable cause is not present. 10
Irrespective of the controversy surrounding the border search, the
Supreme Court in Boyd v. United States" early recognized the difference between searches and seizures involving contraband at the border
and searches of a man's "private books and papers."' 12 The enforcement of customs laws13 necessarily places certain restrictions on those
4
crossing international boundaries.'
Although customs officials have performed intrusive body searches, 1 5
strip searches, 16 searches far removed from the border 17 and searches
9 Comment, Border Searches-A Prostitution of the Fourth Amendment, 10 Amiz. L. REV.
457 (1968).
10 See generally Note, At the Border of Reasonableness: Searches by Customs Officials,
53 CORNELL L. REV. 871 (1968); Comment, The Reasonableness of Border Searches, 4 CALIF.
W. L. REV. 355 (1968).
11 116 U.S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746 (1886).
12 Id. at 623.
The search for and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or goods liable to duties and
concealed to avoid the payment thereof, are totally different things from a search for
and seizure of a man's private books and papers for the purpose of obtaining information therein contained, or of using them as evidence against him. The two things
differ toto coelo. In the one case, the government is entitled to the possession of the
property; in the other it is not. The seizure of stolen goods is authorized by the common law; and the seizure of goods forfeited for a breach of the revenue laws, or
concealed to avoid the duties payable on them, has been authorized by English statutes
for at least two centuries past; and the like seizures have been authorized by our
own revenue acts from the commencement of the government. The first statute passed
by congress to regulate the collection of duties, the act of July 31, 1789 [1 Stat. at
L. 48], contains provisions to this effect. As this act was passed by the same congress
which proposed for adoption the original amendments to the constitution, it is clear
that the members of that body did not regard searches and seizures of this kind as
"unreasonable," and they are not embraced within the prohibition of the amendment.
18 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1964):
Any of the officers or persons authorized to board or search vessels may stop, search,
and examine, as well without as within their respective districts, any vehicle, beast,
or person, on which or whom he or they shall suspect there is merchandise which is
subject to duty, or shall have been introduced into the United States in any manner
contrary to law, whether by the person in possession or charge, or by, in, or upon
such vehicle or beast, or otherwise.
19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1964):
Any officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any vessel or vehicle at any
place in the United States . .. or at any other authorized place, without as well as
within his district, . . . and examine, inspect, and search the vessel or vehicle and every
part thereof and any person, trunk, package, or cargo on board, and to this end may
hail and stop such vessel or vehicle, and use all necessary force to compel compliance.
19 U.S.C. § 1582 (1964):
The Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe regulations for the search of persons
and baggage and he is authorized to employ female inspectors for the examination
and search of persons of their own sex; and all persons coming into the United States
from foreign countries shall be liable to detention and search by authorized officers
or agents of the Government under such regulations.
14 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154, 45 S. Ct. 280, 285, 69 L. Ed. 543, 551-52
(1925). The Court stated that:
Travellers may be stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national
self protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as
entitled to come in, and his belongings and effects which may be lawfully brought in.
'5 Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966).
16 Witt v. United States, 287 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 866 U.S. 950, 81 S.
Ct. 1904, 6 L. Ed.2d 1242 (1961).
17 United States v. Harris, 427 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam), cert. denied,
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where there was no positive evidence that the persons searched had
crossed an international boundary,' the evidence obtained in these
searches has generally been admitted.
This comment will discuss the various forms of border searches and
recent developments relating to them.
INTRUSIVE BODY SEARCH-STRIP SEARCH

The use of body cavities to transport narcotics across international

borders has become a common practice.' 9 The courts have taken judicial notice of this fact 20 and are striving to set up the "clearest possible
guidelines" 2' for law enforcement officials to follow. In establishing
these guidelines the courts have had to weigh the problems of effective
dignity
law enforcement "against the individual's right to human
22
Amendment."
Fourth
the
by
and privacy as protected
Following the recognized border search exception to the probable
cause requirement, the courts at first upheld intrusive searches at the
border on the theory that "mere suspicion" 23 of the possession of
contraband would support such searches. Although mere suspicion was
held adequate for routine border searches, 24 a series of cases beginning
in 1966 established stricter requirements for any of the more intrusive
forms of body searches. 25
THE REASONABLENESS REQUIREMENT

The defendants in Blejare v. United States26 were Canadian citizens.
When stopped by customs officials at the San Ysidro, California, port
of entry Blefare admitted to Canadian officials that he had previously
carried heroin in his stomach through the United States and into
motion for leave to supplement petition granted, 39 U.S.L.W. 3298 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1971)

(No. 780) (150 miles from the border); Castillo-Garcia v. United States, 424 F.2d 482 (9th
Cir. 1970) (105 miles from the border).
18 United States v. Hill, 430 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1970).
19 Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1967) (female, vagina); Rivas v.
United States, 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945, 87 S.Ct. 980, 17 L.
Ed.2d 875 (1967) (male, rectum); Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966)
(male, stomach); Denton v. United States, 310 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1962) (male, rectum);
Barrera v. United States, 276 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1960) (male, stomach); King v. United
States, 258 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 939, 79 S.Ct. 652, 3 L. Ed.2d 639
(1959) (male, stomach).
20 Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366, 376 (9th Cir. 1968).
21 Id. at 383.
22 Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1967).
23 Witt v. United States, 287 F.2d 389, 391 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950,
81 S. Ct. 1904, 6 L. Ed.2d 1242 (1961).
24 Comment, The Reasonableness of Border Searches, 4 CALIF. W. L. REV. 335, 361 (1968).
25 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed.2d 908 (1966); United
States v. Guadalupe-Garza, 421 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1970); Henderson v. United States, 390
F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1967); Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 945, 87 S.Ct. 980, 17 L. Ed.2d 875 (1967); Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870

(9th Cir. 1966).

26 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966).
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Canada, and that he had been searched at the Mexican border with
negative results. Since Blefare had placed the border officials on notice,
when he and another defendant made their return trip to the port
of entry they were detained and subjected to a strip search at the
border. Nothing was found at this time and the defendants were then
taken twelve miles to the office of a doctor who had been previously
alerted. He performed a rectal probe on them and again nothing was
found. They were then ordered to drink a saline solution to induce
vomiting and Blefare did regurgitate but reswallowed quickly. Blefare was then physically restrained and a tube was passed through his
nose and throat into his stomach. A fluid was forced into his stomach
which induced vomiting and expulsion of the heroin.
In upholding the admission of the heroin into evidence, the court
27
found it necessary to distinguish Blefare from Rochin v. California.
Rochin involved an intrusive body search not made at the border in
which the Supreme Court reversed a narcotics conviction. Police officers in Rochin broke into the defendant's bedroom, assaulted him, and
forcibly pumped his stomach. The court in Blefare noted that Rochin
was a non-border search and reasoned that the use of excessive force
and the wrongful entry involved in that case clearly distinguished it
from Blefare. It further reasoned that the decision in Breithaupt v.
A bram2s was more indicative of the law and that "[u]nder all the
circumstances peculiar to this case, this was a reasonable search and
seizure. ' 29 The Supreme Court in Breithaupt weighed the taking of
Breithaupt's blood while he was unconscious against the public interest
in preventing "slaughter on our highways ' 30 and concluded that the
search was not unreasonable. In Blefare protection of the public was
also involved-the stemming of the tide of illicit drugs into the United
States. Thus the search was held to be reasonable.
THE "CLEAR

INDICATION"

TEST

The "clear indication" test involving a body search was formulated
5 1 The Court upheld
by the Supreme Court in Schmerber v.California
the taking of a blood sample from a defendant who had been involved
in an automobile accident. The officer who ordered that the blood be
taken acted without a warrant and against the defendant's protests.
27 342 U.S. 165, 72 S. Ct. 205, 96 L. Ed. 183 (1952).
28 352 U.S. 432, 77 S. Ct. 408, 1 L. Ed.2d 448 (1957).
29 Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870, 880 (9th Cir. 1966). The "peculiar circumstances" being that a border search was involved and the use of force was not so excessive
as in Rochin. The "reasonableness" standard for an internal body search was also discussed in Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745, 753 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356
U.S. 914, 78 S. Ct. 672, 2 L. Ed.2d 586 (1958).
30 Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439, 77 S. Ct. 408, 412, 1 L. Ed.2d 448, 453 (1957).
31 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed.2d 908 (1966).
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However, the Court did limit the occasions on which such evidence
might be obtained.
The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth
Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the mere
chance that desired evidence might be obtained. In the absence
of a clear indication that in fact such evidence will be found, these
fundamental human interests require law officers to suffer the risk
that such evidence may disappear unless there is an immediate
search.

32

Schmerber's "clear indication" test was first applied to border
searches in Rivas v. United States.33 Rivas presented his registration
certificate3 4 to a customs inspector when he crossed the international
border from Mexico into the United States. The agent noticed that
Rivas seemed nervous and that he had what appeared to be fresh
needle marks on his arms. Another customs agent subsequently made
a personal search of Rivas during which he refused to spread his buttocks so that the agent could check his rectum for contraband. Concluding that Rivas was concealing something in his rectum, the customs
agents took him to a doctor's office. Upon the termination of the
examination of Rivas' eyes and arms, to which he had consented,
the doctor concluded that he was under the influence of drugs. The
agents then requested the doctor to examine the defendant's rectal
area. Rivas refused to submit to the rectal examination, he was then
arrested for impeding a federal officer in the performance of his duty,
conand physical force was used to complete the examination. It was
35
found.
were
narcotics
and
manner
medical
usual
the
in
ducted
The court reaffirmed the border search exception to the probable
cause requirement and held that mere suspicion was enough to validate
an ordinary border search. 36 The circuit court then turned to Schmerber and borrowed some of the Supreme Court's "clear indication"
terminology.
An honest "plain indication" that a search involving an intrusion
beyond the body's surface is justified cannot rest on the mere
chance that desired evidence may be obtained. Thus we need
not hold the search of any body cavity is justified merely because
it is a border search, and nothing more. There must exist facts
82 Id. at 769, 86 S. Ct. at 1835, 16 L. Ed.2d at 919 (emphasis added).

83 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945, 87 S. Ct. 980, 17 L. Ed.2d 875
(1967).
34 18 U.S.C. § 1407 (1964). This statute requires persons who are users of narcotics or
those who have been convicted of a narcotics violation with a penalty of more than one
year to register with customs officials upon entering or leaving the United States.
35 Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703, 705-6 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945,
87 S. Ct. 980, 17 L. Ed.2d 875 (1967).
B6 d. at 709.
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creating a clear indication, or plain suggestion, of the smuggling.
Nor need those facts reach the dignity of nor be the equivalent
of "probable cause" 3necessary
for an arrest and search at a place
7
other than a border.
Rivas had been previously convicted of a narcotics violation and was
a registered user of narcotics. When stopped at the border he appeared
extremely nervous and fresh needle marks were found on his arms.
He refused to allow a rectal examination and was under the influence
of narcotics. These facts were held to furnish the "clear indication" to
the customs officials that he might be smuggling contraband.3 1
Thus the "clear indication" test established in Schmerbers9 and
applied to intrusive border searches in Rivas40 effectively distinguished
between the "mere suspicion" requirement for ordinary border searches
and the stricter requirements for more intrusive searches.
THE "REAL SUSPICION" TEST

41
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Henderson v. United States
added another requirement to the "clear indication" test of SchmerberRivas. Mrs. Henderson was stopped by customs agents at the border
as she crossed it in an automobile driven by another party. One of the
agents thought that he had stopped and searched Mrs. Henderson
previously and that contraband had been found at that time. This
recollection (later shown to be erroneous) was the sole reason for a
subsequent strip search of the defendant by an inspectress. Since she
did not cooperate fully with the inspectress when she was ordered to
bend over and pull her buttocks apart and up so that an inspection
could be made of her vagina, the inspectress concluded that she was
concealing something in her vagina. On the basis of the inspectress'
suspicions and the agent's recollection, Mrs. Henderson was taken to a
doctor who removed two rubber packages, each two inches in diameter,
42
which contained a total of ninety-three grams of heroin.
In reversing Mrs. Henderson's conviction on the ground that her
fourth amendment rights had been violated, the court stated that if
anything more than the ordinary border search is involved, that is,
"if the party, male or female, is to be required to strip, we think
that something more, at least a real suspicion, directed specifically to
that person, should be required. ' 43 Thus a real suspicion that con37 Id. at 710 (court's emphasis).
38 Id.
89 Schmerber v. United States, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed.2d 908 (1966).
40 Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945, 87 S.
Ct. 980, 17 L. Ed.2d 875 (1967).
41 390 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1967).
42 Id. at 809.
43 Id. at 808 (emphasis added).
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traband will be found directed specifically toward the person involved
is a necessity for a strip search. If the search goes beyond a casual
examination of the body and involves an internal search then the
"clear indication" test must be applied before such a search would
be lawful. 44 Since the internal search of Mrs. Henderson resulted solely
from the customs agent's erroneous recollection and
the inspectress'
45
suspicions, the "clear indication" test was not met.

Although Henderson established the "real suspicion" test for strip
searches, the test was not specifically defined until the Ninth Circuit
rendered its opinion in United States v. Guadalupe-Garza.4 The defendant in Guadalupe-Garza was detained at a secondary inspection
point at the border after a customs inspector noted that the defendant
seemed to be shying away from him. Upon subsequent questioning, the
defendant stated he had brought nothing with him from Mexico. The
inspector observed that he appeared nervous while answering these
questions. The defendant was then directed to disrobe, but nothing
was found during the strip search. The inspector saw what appeared
to be old "tracks" on his arms and noticed that the defendant's "stomach was beating fast. ' 47 Based on these observations and the defendant's
evasive answers to subsequent questions concerning the "tracks,"
he was taken to a hospital where a rectal probe was performed with
negative results. An emetic was then injected into his hip with unsatisfactory results. After oral emetics were administered the defendant
expelled the contents of his stomach which included two balloons
containing approximately five grams of heroin.4

I

The court held that the heroin was the product of an illegal search
and then proceeded to define the "real suspicion" test that had first
appeared in Henderson.
"Real suspicion" justifying the initiation of a strip search is subjective suspicion supported by objective, articulable facts that
would reasonably lead an experienced, prudent customs official
to suspect that a particular person seeking to cross our border is
concealing something on his body for the purpose of transporting
it into the United States contrary to law.
The objective, articulable facts must bear some reasonable
Id. The court stated:
[I]f there is to be more than casual examination of the body, if in the course of the
search of a woman there is to be a requirement that she manually open her vagina
for visual inspection to see if she has something concealed there, we think that we
should require more than a mere suspicion. Surely, to require such a performance is
a serious invasion of personal privacy and dignity, and so unlawful if "unwarranted."
Surely, in such a case, to be warranted, the official's action should be backed by at
least the "dear indication," the "plain suggestion," required in Schmerber and Rivas.
45 Id. at 809.
46 421 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1970).
47 Id. at 877.
44

48 ld. at 878.
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relationship to suspicion that something is concealed on the body
of the person to be searched; otherwise, the scope of the search is
not related to the justification for its initiation, as it must meet
the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment. (Cf. Terry
v. Ohio, ... , 392 U.S. at 29, 88 S. Ct. 1868; Warden v. Hayden
(1967) 387 U.S. 294, 310, 87
S. Ct. 1642, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782 (Mr.
49
Justice Fortas, concurring).
The court stated that the "objective, articulable facts" in the case did
not warrant a real suspicion that the defendant was concealing something on his person.50
Although cases involving border searches and their attendant problems were a proven fertile field for litigation, the Supreme Court
consistently denied certiorari 5' until this precedent was broken by
the Court in a strip search case, United States v. Johnson.52 Mrs.
Johnson and a female companion were stopped by a customs inspector
as they walked across the border at San Ysidro, California. After
talking with Mrs. Johnson, the inspector requested a customs inspectress to search her. During the course of the strip search heroin was
found hidden in the defendant's panties.5 3 At the defendant's trial
the inspector testified "that he had considerable experience in examining persons at the border for narcotics."5 4 The inspector was
then asked by the prosecution if he had been suspicious before he
ordered the strip search of the defendant. He replied, "I was, yes, sir." 55
The court in reversing the defendant's conviction held that the
"real suspicion" test as defined in Guadalupe-Garzawas controlling
and that this test had not been met. The strip search in Johnson was
not supported by "objective, articulable facts that would reasonably
lead an experienced, prudent customs official to suspect that" 56 Mrs.
Johnson was concealing contraband on her person. The search was
initiated solely on the inspector's suspicion. The court stated that
there were no "objective, articulable facts" in the record to support
his suspicion and if "such facts existed, it was incumbent upon the
'7
government to prove them.",
49

Id. at 879.

50 Id. The "objective articulable facts" being that the defendant had tilted his head and

had shied away from the customs inspector. He had also appeared nervous. The observation of the "tracks" on his arms and his evasive answers did not occur until after he had
been stripped.
51 Note, At the Border of Reasonableness: Searches by Customs Officials, 53 CORNELL L.
REv. 871, 872 & n.12 (1968).
52425 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 39 U.S.L.W. 3297 (Jan. 11, 1971) (No. 577,
1970 Term).
53 Id. at 631.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 United States v. Guadalupe-Garza, 421 F.2d 876, 879 (9th Cir. 1970).
57 United States v. Johnson, 425 F.2d 630, 632 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 39 U.S.L.W.
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THE EXTENDED BORDER SEARCH

If the term "border search" were taken literally, only those searches
occurring directly on the international border could be construed
as such. If this were the definition, the only class of persons subject to
border searches would be those physically located at an actual point
of entry into the United States. The statutory authority given customs
officials is not so restrictive as to require a literal interpretation of
the term "border search." 58 If the authority of customs officers was
strictly limited to the immediate area of the point of entry, the customs
laws could not be effectively enforced. 59 The classes of persons who are
subject to border searches were discussed by the court in United States
v. Glaziou:
The class of persons who may be subjected to a border search
is not limited to those suspected persons who are searched for
contraband upon first entering the United States. Also included
in the class are persons who work in a border area when leaving
the area; persons engaged in suspicious activity near border areas;
and, in some situations, persons and vehicles after they have
cleared an initial customs checkpoint and have entered the United
States. Therefore, we hold that when an individual has direct
contact with a border area, or an individual's movements are
reasonably related to the border area, that individual is a member
of the class of persons that a customs officer may, if his suspicions
are aroused, stop and search while the individual is still within the
border area.60
3297 (Jan. 11, 1971) (No. 577, 1970 Term). In a strong dissent, Judge Byrne distinguished
Johnson from Henderson and Guadalupe-Garza. In those two cases an intrusive body
search occurred following a strip search but here, the defendant merely undressed, handed
her clothing to the inspectress and the heroin was found in the crotch of her panties.
"There was no searching investigation of the appellant's body surface, no examination of
her skin or private parts," at 633. The dissent also expressed the opinion that the case
was "on all fours" with Witt v. United States, 287 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1961). The only
difference was that in Witt the heroin was found in Witt's brassiere and in the instant
case it was found in Johnson's panties. Thus Judge Byrne suggests that the holding in
Johnson effectively overrules Witt. The "articulable facts" test was also followed in the recent case of United States v. Saville, No. 25,799 (9th Cir., Dec. 21, 1970). The court held
that the customs agent's subjective suspicion met the "articulable facts" test. As in the
Johnson case the female defendant had concealed the narcotics in her panties but the male
defendant employed a rather unique article of underclothing to transport the narcotics.
In this writer's opinion he was the first to attempt to smuggle heroin across the border
in a jockey strap.
58 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1964) gives customs officials the authority to search for contraband
"as well without as within their respective districts."
19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1964) also broadly defines customs official's authority to "go on
board any vessel or vehicle at any place in the United States ... or at any other authorized
place, without as well within his district, . . . and . . . search the vessel or vehicle . . .

and any person, trunk, package or cargo on board.
Thus by statute customs officials
are not restricted to the immediate border area.
59 United States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1121, 89
$. Ct. 999, 22 L. Ed.2d 126 (1969).
60402 F.2d 8, 14 (2d Cir. 1968) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1121, 89 S. Ct.
999, 22 L Ed.2d 126 (1969).
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In the same opinion the court, citing Carroll v. United States,61
stated that the border search doctrine would not apply after an individual had left the "reasonably defined border area." 62 The court
then noted that although an ordinary border search could not be
justified outside the immediate border area, this did not preclude officers from making an extended border search. 63
Although the Supreme Court in Carroll spoke of reinstatement of
the probable cause requirement once a person was "lawfully within the
country," 64 evidence obtained in searches some distance from the
border has generally been held admissible although the searches were
based on less than probable cause.6 5 The Supreme Court has noted
that the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have not always been in accord on
the tests they employ to determine the legality of an extended border
search.66
THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND THE SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT

The surveillance requirement for extended border searches was
expressly recognized by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in King
v. United States.67 A search made eight miles from the border was held
to be a valid border search. The customs officials had been notified
by an informer that King had gone to Mexico to purchase amphetamine pills and would cross the border driving one of two automobiles
(the model, color and license number were also furnished). King was
spotted by a customs agent and was followed eight miles inland until
he was stopped, his automobile searched and a quantity of amphetamine pills discovered. 68 The court reasoned that customs searches
could not be made precisely on the border but of necessity had to
61 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925).
62 United States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8, 14 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1121, 89
S. Ct. 999, 22 L. Ed.2d 126 (1969).
63 Id. at n.4. Analogous to the extended border search are those searches made by immigration officers in their searches for aliens pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (1964). See
generally Comment, Border Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 77 YALE L.J. 1007,
1010 n.15 (1968).
. 64267 U.S. 132, 154, 45 S. Ct. 280, 285, 69 L. Ed. 543, 552 (1925). The Fifth Circuit also
recognized the existence of an imaginary geographical barrier beyond which probable cause
would be a requisite to searches by customs officials. The court stated in Thomas v. United
States, 372 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1967) that "there must come a point when a traveler's
entry into this country is complete so that the protection of the Fourth Amendment
attaches to him," After passing this point "the traveler. no longer may be the subject of a
border search based on suspicion."
65 E.g., Stassi v. United States, 410 F.2d 946, 951 (5th Cir. 1969) (reasonable cause to
suspect that defendant possessed contraband supported a search 10 miles from the border):
Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 977, 87
S. Ct. 519, 17 L. Ed.2d 439 (1966) (constant surveillance supported an extended border
search).
06 Harris v. United States, 400 US. 1211, -, 91 S. Ct. 4, 5, 27 L. Ed.2d 30, 32 (1970).
67348 F.2d 814, 816 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 926, 86 S. Ct. 314, 15 L. Ed.2d
339 (1965). •
68 Id. at 815-16.
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"be made somewhere north of the border between Mexico 'and the
United States." 69 King had been kept under constant surveillance from
the time he crossed the border until he was stopped. 70 It was evident
that whatever was found in the search had been in the automobile
when it crossed the border."
To the surveillance requirement set out in King the court in Alexander v. United States72 added the "totality of surrounding circumstances" doctrine:
Where, however, a search for contraband by Customs officers is
not made at or in the immediate vicinity of the point of international border crossing, the legality of the search must be tested by
a determination of whether the totality of surrounding circumstances, including the time and distance elapsed as well as the
manner and extent of surveillance, are such to convince the fact
finder with reasonable certainty that any contraband which might
be found in or on the vehicle at the time of search was aboard the
vehicle at the time of entry into the jurisdiction of the United
States. Any search by Customs officials which meets this test is
properly called a "border search." 78
The vehicle involved in Alexander had been placed under surveillance when it crossed the border into the United States. The car was
under constant surveillance until it was stopped except for a couple of
minutes when it was lost from view. This hiatus did not invalidate
the search as there was no evidence tending to show any change in the
condition of the automobile during the break in surveillance.7 4 Further, neither the distance traveled nor the time elapsed indicated any
opportunity for a change in condition.
The "totality of circumstances" test promulgated in Alexander was
followed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Rodriguez-Gonzalez v. United States." Acting on information supplied by an informant, customs officials allowed a car occupied by a man and a woman
to pass across the border at San Ysidro, California, and followed it to
a public parking lot in San Diego, California, where it remained
69 Murgia v. United States, 285 F.2d 14, 16 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 977, 81
S. Ct. 1946, 6 L. Ed.2d 1265 (1961).
70 King v. United States, 348 F.2d 814, 816 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 926, 86
S. Ct. 314, 15 L. Ed.2d 339 (1965). Although the surveillance by the customs officer was
the key to the court's opinion, it noted that the specificity of the informant's information,
the reasonableness of the time lapse between the defendant's crossing of the border and the
search, and the reasonable distance from the border all contributed to the validity of the
search.
71 Id.

72 362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 977, 87 S. Ct. 519, 17 L. Ed.2d 439
(1966).
73 Id. at 382 (emphasis added).
74 Id.
75 378 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1967).
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overnight under surveillance. The following day the defendant entered
the car, left the parking lot and was heading toward Los Angeles
when he was stopped and searched by customs officials. Although the
search occurred some twenty miles from the border and fifteen hours
after the car had crossed the border, the court held that it was a valid
border search.
Citing the test in Alexander, the court stated that there could "be
no doubt that the manner and extent of the surveillance of the car
appellant was driving excludes the possibility that the marijuana found
hidden in the rear door was placed there at any time following entry
into the United States. From the time the car in question crossed the
international border ...until it was stopped,... it was under constant
76
surveillance by a team of officers."
Three basic considerations are weighed by the courts in applying
the "totality of circumstances" test. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals consistently states that the amount of time that has lapsed between the time a defendant crosses the border and the time a search
takes place is one of the considerations. The second consideration is
the total distance that a defendant has traveled from the border. The
surveillance maintained by the customs officials is the third consideration. In light of two recent Ninth Circuit cases, 77 the "totality of
circumstances" test has been trimmed to only one "circumstance"
-surveillance.
In Castillo-Garcia v. United States7s customs agents had received
information from an informant that a certain automobile would cross
the border carrying a large amount of marijuana. When the car crossed
the border it was placed under constant surveillance maintained some
seven hours until the car was stopped and finally searched 105 miles
from the border. The court upheld the decision of the trial court to
admit into evidence the marijuana seized during the search. The
court reasoned that as long as surveillance was maintained the distance
from the border was important only as it related to the surveillance.
The distance involved in this case could have been 105 miles or 500
miles and had surveillance been shown, it would still have been held
to be a valid border search. 79 The time element involved was not even
considered by the court.
76 Id. at 258, accord, Bloomer v. United States, 409 F.2d 869, 871 (9th Cir. 1969) (border
search of car at laundromat in San Ysidro, Cal.); Gonzalez-Alonso v. United States, 379
F.2d 347, 350 (9th Cir. 1967) (border search 11 miles from the border); Lannom v. United
States, 381 F.2d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1042, 88 S. Ct. 784, 19 L.
Ed.2d 833 (1968) (border search 1 /2 miles from the border).
77 United States v. Harris, 427 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam), cert. denied, motion
for leave to supplement petition granted, 39 U.S.L.W. 3298 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1971) (No. 780);
Castillo-Garcia v. United States, 424 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1970).
78 424 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. .1970).
79ld. at 485.
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The search and seizure of a truck parked in Los Angeles, California,
some 150 miles from the border was held to be a border search in
United States v. Harris.80 The defendants filed an application for a
stay of judgment of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals pending
disposition of a petition for certiorari which had been filed in the
Supreme Court. Mr. Justice Douglas in granting the stay noted the
different tests applied in the Fifth and Ninth Circuits regarding the
legality of extended border searches, but indicated no view on the
merits. He did, however, state that the "rather old dictum of this
Court in Carrollv. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69
L. Ed. 543, hardly meets the refinements of these new distinctions. "81
Justice Douglas was of the
Certiorari was denied in this case although
82
granted.
been
have
should
it
that
opinion
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT AND REASONABLE

CAUSE TO SUSPECT

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals showed its reluctance to view
all customs related searches as border searches in Marsh v. United
States.83 In this case a county constable had stopped the defendant's
car sixty-three miles from the border on the basis of a call from a cus84
toms agent asking him to "exercise a lookout for Mr. Martinez."
The constable detained the defendant until a customs agent arrived
and searched the car. At the trial no proof was offered as to the information which caused the customs agent on the border to telephone
the constable and ask him to arrest Martinez.
The court recognized that the authority to make a border search was
broad and that the definition of border was elastic. However, it refused to view the search as a border search stating:
[I]f the Government seeks to qualify the action as a geographically
"extended" border search, it must show at least the circumstances
known to the officers at the border which reasonably justified the
request relayed to officers in the interior. Any other doctrine
would render travelers who had recently entered into this country
subject to almost unlimited arrest and search without any cause
save the simple request of a border officer at an interior point. 85
The court did not specify the circumstances that would have justified
the search as a border search. It only mentioned those which would
reasonably justify the request relayed to the constable.
80427 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam), cert. denied, motion for leave to supplement petition granted, 39 U.S.L.W. 3298 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1971) (No. 780).
81 Harris v. United States, 400 U.S. 1211, -,

91 S. Ct. 4, 5, 27 L. Ed.2d 30, 32 (1970).

82 39 U.S.L.W. 3298 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1971) (No. 780).
83 344 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1965).
84 Id. at 322.
85 Id. at 325.
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The "reasonable cause to suspect" requirement was discussed by
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Willis v. United States. 6 In
Willis the defendant's vehicle had returned to the border after having
once departed for the interior. It was then driven parallel to the border
and during the course of the journey the vehicle was observed by the
officers as it was driven to a lonely place off the highway. This particular area was notorious as a pickup point for smuggled narcotics. The
car was subsequently stopped by the officers six miles from the border
and contraband was found. Based on the officers' observations of the
car on its circuitous route along the border the court held that they had
"reasonable cause to suspect that the appellants were bringing heroin
into the United States in a manner contrary to law."8' 7 Further, the
car was under constant surveillance except for a short period of time.
Thus by implication the Fifth Circuit recognized that surveillance
was one of the considerations to be weighed in establishing a "reasonable cause to suspect."
The court, in Thomas v. United States,8s was specific in setting
out the criteria required for an extended border search. Customs authorities in El Paso, Texas, received a tip from an informer that a certain person, who was described in detail, was attempting to purchase
narcotics in Mexico. Thomas' hotel was placed under surveillance
and when he crossed the border into Mexico, he was followed by a
customs agent. The agent broke off the surveillance when he became
fearful that Thomas had seen him. When Thomas re-entered the
United States by streetcar, he passed through an inspection station but
was not apprehended. Customs agents stopped and searched him some
one and one half hours after he had returned to the United States
and within six blocks of the border. The court ruled that the narcotics
were seized in a valid border search. The tip from the informer and
the surveillance furnished the agents with "reasonable cause to suspect"8 19 that Thomas was carrying contraband. The court distinguished
86 370 F.2d 604 (5th Cir. 1966). The basis of the "reasonable cause to suspect" test is
found in 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1964) which states that:
Any of the officers or persons authorized to board or search vessels may stop, search,
and examine, as well without as within their respective districts, any vehicle, beast,
or person, on which or whom he or they shall suspect there is merchandise which is
subject to duty, or shall have been introduced into the United States in any manner
contrary to law, whether by the person in possession or charge, or by, in, or upon
such vehicle or beast, or otherwise, and to search any trunk or envelope, wherever
found, in which he may have a reasonable cause to suspect there is merchandise which
was imported contrary to law; and if any such officer or other person so authorized
shall find any merchandise on or about any such vehicle, beast, or person, or in any
such trunk or envelope, which he shall have reasonable cause to believe is subject to
duty, or to have been unlawfully introduced into the United States, whether by the
person in possession or charge, or by, in, or upon such vehicle, beast, or otherwise, he
shall seize and secure the same for trial (emphasis added).
87 Id. at 604.
88 372 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1967).
89 Id. at 254.
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the case from Marsh 0 by noting that the government in Marsh had
revealed none of the circumstances which would have justified the
extended border search. In the instant case, the circumstances revealed
that the agents had "ample reason to suspect" Thomas, and thus the
search was justified.9 1
The importance of surveillance was again discussed in Walker v.
United States.92 Customs agents had received a tip that the defendant
was going to bring heroin across the border. He was not searched at
the border and was allowed to proceed into the United States. The
car was kept under surveillance by the customs agents until they were
forced to contact the Texas Department of Public Safety to set up a
roadblock to stop the defendant because of the high rate of speed of his
car. He was stopped at the roadblock, his auto searched, and heroin was
found. The court refused to suppress the evidence holding that the
search was a valid border search. It stated that "[W]hile border searches
must measure up to the constitutional standard of reasonableness, suspicion that a person is carrying merchandise unlawfully imported into
the United States is sufficient. ' 93 Although the court reasoned that
suspicion was enough to support an extended border search, it also
stressed that the suspicion had to be reasonable. Without the surveillance employed in Walker it is doubtful that the court could have
found the degree of reasonableness necessary to support an extended
border search.
Stassi v. United States9 4 reiterates the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals'
position that only "reasonable cause to suspect" is necessary to justify
an extended border search. Again, surveillance was involved. Customs
officials in McAllen, Texas, received information that a shipment
of heroin would be smuggled into the United States and a subsequent
phone call gave a description of the smuggler. The tip led customs
officials to a bus station where a woman was spotted who matched the
description given by the informant. Without the woman's knowledge,
her luggage was searched and found to contain heroin. She was not
arrested but allowed to board a bus to Houston, Texas, where she was
to meet her contact. A customs agent was on the bus with her and other
agents followed in automobiles. Both the woman and her contact were
arrested in Houston and the heroin was seized. In upholding the
search as a border search the court held that "tilt was necessary only
that the customs agents had reasonable cause to suspect that the suitcase contained heroin which had been smuggled into this country, and
Marsh v. United States, 344 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1965).
91 Thomas v. United States, 372 F.2d 252, 255 (5th Cir. 1967).
92 404 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1968).
00

93 Id. at 902.

94 410 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1969).
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that their conduct in connection with the search and seizure was
reasonable." 95 The knowledge possessed by the customs agents of the
daily smuggling of narcotics into the United States from Mexico gave
them reasonable cause to suspect that the heroin had been brought in
unlawfully. Their conduct and methods in making the search were
reasonable. 96
CONCLUSION

The courts have developed these several tests to be applied to
searches at the border and to extended border searches. These tests
are not always clearly enunciated and the application of the tests to
particular cases has not been consistent throughout the federal circuits.
It is evident that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recognizes the
importance of surveillance in establishing the legality of an extended
border search. Although their opinions stress the "reasonable cause
to suspect" test, surveillance forms the basis of the reasonableness of
the test. It is submitted that the tests employed by the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits in determining the legality of extended border searches are
97
not as distinguishable as urged by the United States Supreme Court.
Body searches at the border have given birth to a number of tests.
The degree of intrusiveness involved determines the test to be used. All
tests exceed the "mere suspicion" requirement for ordinary border
searches, but none reach the dignity of the probable cause requirement
of the fourth amendment.
It is clear that the federal courts experience difficulty in deciding
which test to apply in any given situation. If learned judges experience
these difficulties, what can be expected of law enforcement officials who
are charged with enforcing the customs laws? In granting certiorari
in United States v. Johnson,9s the Supreme Court has recognized the
existing problems and could go far in resolving them.
95 Id. at 951-52 (court's emphasis).
96 Id.
97 Harris v. United States, 400 U.S. 1211, -,

91 S. Ct. 4, 5, 27 L. Ed.2d 30, 32 (1970).
08425 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 39 U.S.L.W. 3297 (Jan. 11, 1971) (No. 577,

1970 Term).
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